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[COMMENTS]
The Rule Against Perpetuities-The
Implication of a Reasonable Time for the
Performance of a Contingency to the
Vesting of Future Interests in Commercial
Transactions-Maryland's Hybrid Approach
to the Rule Against Perpetuities in
Commercial Contexts
I. Introduction
This comment will discuss the application of the Rule Against
Perpetuities ("the Rule") to commercial transactions. After
examining methods by which other courts have carved out
exceptions to the Rule for commercial transactions or have read
certain implications into commercial transactions to save them from
violating the Rule, it examines the way in which Maryland has dealt
with commercial transactions under the Rule. Maryland takes a
hybrid approach to saving interests from the Rule, by which it
implies a reasonable time only when parties to a contract creating
a future interest can affect the interest's vesting, but refuses to
imply a reasonable time when a contingency to an interest's vesting
is controlled by a third party.
Such a hybrid approach leads to confusion because it is not
clear to what extent a party obligates itself to assure a contin-
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gency's satisfaction and when a contingency will be held to be
controlled by third parties. The better approach for Maryland to
take would be to imply a reasonable time for an interest's vesting
into all commercial transactions, regardless of who controls the
contingency. By doing so, Maryland would join other jurisdictions
that have followed the lead of California in Wong v. DiGrazia.1
Those jurisdictions recognize that the social utility of permitting
certain commercial transactions outweighs the policies protected by
the Rule. Such a rule would be in accord with other Maryland
cases on the Rule and reduce the complexity of an already tangled
web of law on the subject.
Part II will briefly highlight the mechanics of the Rule Against
Perpetuities as well as discuss modern reforms to the Rule such as
the doctrines of wait and see and cy pres reformation of interests
that would otherwise violate the Rule. In part III, the methods by
which courts in other jurisdictions have made allowances for
commercial transactions under the Rule will be compared to
Maryland's approach.
II. Background
Part of the common law tradition for centuries,2 the Rule
Against Perpetuities has long vexed students and practitioners with
its intricacies. Indeed the complexities of the Rule have led some
writers to call for its abolition3 and has even prompted a court to
hold that lack of familiarity with the Rule is an insufficient basis
upon which to find a lawyer incompetent.4 It is beyond the scope
1. 386 P.2d 817 (Cal. 1963) (en banc).
2. The Rule Against Perpetuities first appeared in 1681 in The Duke of Norfolk's Case,
3 Ch. Cas. 1, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (1681).
3. See G. Graham Waite, Let's Abolish the Rule Against Perpetuities, 21 REAL EST. L.J.
93 (1993).
4. In the case of Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961) (en banc), intended
beneficiaries of a will sued the attorney who drafted it after the will was found to be void
under the Rule. In denying the plaintiffs' claims against the attorney for malpractice and as
third party beneficiaries of the contract between the drafting attorney and testator, the
California Supreme Court held that it was not negligence or breach of contract for the
attorney to fail to effectuate the testator's wishes. See id. at 690. The court echoed the
words of John Chipman Gray that:
"There is something in the subject which seems to facilitate error. Perhaps it is
because the mode of reasoning is unlike that with which lawyers are most familiar.
... A long ist might be formed of the demonstrable blunders with regard to its
questions by eminent men, blunders which they themselves have been sometimes
the first to acknowledge; and there are few lawyers of any practice in drawing wills
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of this comment to attempt to provide its readers with a full
description of the workings of the Rule.5 A brief description,
however, of the basic mechanics of the Rule is useful for a fuller
understanding of this topic.
The Rule Against Perpetuities invalidates interests which have
the possibility, however slight, of vesting more than twenty-one
years, plus gestation periods if applicable, after all lives in being at
the time of the interest's creation. Originally applied more than
310 years ago in The Duke of Norfolk's Case,6 the Rule was
classically restated by John Chipman Gray as: "No interest is good
unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after
some life in being at the creation of the interest."7  The Rule
Against Perpetuities developed as a reaction to attempts in feudal
England to keep land within families.' Although often confused
with the rule against unreasonable restraints on the alienation of
and settlements who have not at some time either fallen into the net which the
Rule spreads for the unwary, or at least shuddered to think how narrowly they
have escaped it."
Id. (quoting JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES xi (4th ed. 1942)).
The court went on to hold:
In view of the state of the law relating to perpetuities and restraints on
alienation and the nature of the error, if any, assertedly made by [the attorney] in
preparing the instrument, it would not be proper to hold that [the attorney] failed
to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity
commonly exercise.
Id.
5. Harvard Law School professor W. Barton Leach authored several articles discussing
the Rule, two of which purport to provide a student of the Rule with instruction on its
workings. See W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REV. 638 (1938); W.
Barton Leach, Perpetuities: The Nutshell Revisited, 78 HARV. L. REV. 973 (1965) [hereinafter
Leach, The Nutshell Revisited]. A more recent article details the Rule, taking into account
recent reforms to the Rule such as "wait and see" and "cy pres." See Jesse Dukeminier, A
Modem Guide to Perpetuities, 74 CAL L. REV. 1567 (1986). Both Leach's and Dukeminier's
articles are instructive to those unfamiliar with or in need of a refresher on the Rule.
6. 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (1681). For an informative discussion of the
turbulent history surrounding The Duke of Norfolk's Case, see Herbert Barry, The Duke of
Norfolk's Case, 23 VA. L. REV. 538 (1937).
7. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201, at 191 (Roland
Gray ed., 4th ed. 1942). Although the fourth edition of Gray's classic treatise on the Rule
was published in 1942, the fourth edition of the text remains largely unchanged from its
original form when first published in 1886. See W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities Legislation:
Hail, Pennsylvanial, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1124, n.3 (1960).
8. See THOMAS F. BERGIN & PAUL G. HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND &
FUTURE INTERESTS 178-80 (2d ed. 1984).
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land,9 it is a rule that primarily guards against the remote vesting
of future interests.
A. The Basic Mechanics of the Rule Against Perpetuities
Generally, the Rule declares void ab initio interests that are
not vested upon their creation and that need not necessarily vest or
fail within the Rule's measuring period. The measuring period of
the Rule is lives in being" at the creation of the interest plus
twenty-one years." Where the parties to the instrument creating
the interest are both corporations and the instrument makes no
reference to measuring lives, the measuring period is merely
twenty-one years.
12
In analyzing an interest under the Rule, it is first necessary to
determine whether the interest is subject to the Rule's application.
Only if an interest is subject to the Rule is it necessary to deter-
mine whether the interest has the possibility of vesting too
remotely. To make this determination, an interest is judged
prospectively from the time of the interest's creation, traditionally
without regard to events that occur after the interest's creation. 3
As explained by W. Barton Leach,
A future interest is invalid unless it is absolutely certain
that it must vest within the period of perpetuities. Probability
9. Although both the Rule Against Perpetuities and the rule against unreasonable
restraints on alienation have the same goal, to keep property alienable, they accomplish this
goal by different means. "The rule against unreasonable restraints on alienation is directed
primarily against attempts to make vested interests, present or future, inalienable." 6
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.2, at 411-12 (1952).
10. A life in being is defined as "the remaining duration of the life of a person who is
in existence at the time when the deed or will takes effect." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 924
(6th ed. 1990).
11. See GRAY, supra note 7. The period of 21 years was initially developed "to cover
the time necessary for the birth of posthumous children, and also the minority of an
executory devisee unborn at the death of the testator." Id. § 171, at 163. The 21-year period
was first added only in cases of actually minority, but later became a period in gross. See 3
LEWIS M. SIMES & ALLAN F. SMrrH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 1215, at 99 (2d ed.
1956). Note that most versions of the Rule provide for a gestation period to account for
cases of posthumous birth where such gestation actually occurs. See 3 id. § 1224, at 112.
12. See Fitchie v. Brown, 211 U.S. 321, 334 (1908); Symphony Space, Inc. v. Pergola
Properties, Inc., 669 N.E.2d 799, 806 (N.Y. 1996); Ferrero Constr. Co. v. Dennis Rourke
Corp., 536 A.2d 1137, 1144 n.7 (Md. 1988); United Va. Bank v. Union Oil Co., 197 S.E.2d
174, 177 (Va. 1973). Because corporations may conceivably exist forever, the concept of
measuring lives is inappropriate to transactions among corporate parties.
13. See Fitzpatrick v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 155 A.2d 702, 705 (Md.
1959).
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of vesting, however great, is not sufficient. Moreover, the
certainty of vesting must have existed at the time when the
instrument took effect .... It is immaterial that the contingen-
cies actually do occur within the permissible period or actually
have occurred when the validity of the instrument is first
litigated.14
Quite obviously, the possibility of an interest vesting later than the
perpetuities period removes the absolute certainty of that interest
vesting within the perpetuities period.
As stated above, interests that are vested upon their creation
are exempt from application of the Rule. 5 Such vested interests
include reversions, 16 absolutely vested remainders, and vested
remainders subject to complete divestment.17 Also exempt from
the Rule are possibilities of reverter18 and rights of entry.19
14. Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, supra note 5, at 642-43. Note however that this
traditional analysis has been altered by jurisdictions which have adopted the "wait and see"
approach to perpetuities. See infra Part II.B.1.
15. See GRAY, supra note 7, § 201, at 191.
16. Maryland courts define a reversion as
any reversionary interest which is not subject to a condition precedent. It is the
residue of an estate left in the testator to commence in possession after the
determination of some particular estate devised by him. Hence, a reversion arises
whenever the owner of real estate devises or conveys an interest in it less than his
own.
Ringgold v. Carvel, 76 A.2d 327, 332 (Md. 1950) (citation omitted).
17. See 3 SIMEs & SMrrH, supra note 11, § 1235, at 140. Distinguishing between
contingent remainders and vested remainders, the Maryland Court of Appeals explained that
a contingent remainder is one which is either limited to a person not in being or
not certain or ascertained, or so limited to a certain person that his right to the
estate depends upon some contingent event in the future. But when ... the
remainderman is then ascertainable, the remainder immediately becomes vested,
for a vested remainder is one which is limited to a person in being, whose right to
the estate does not depend upon the happening or failure of any future event.
Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore v. Bouse, 29 A.2d 906,909 (Md. 1943). Remainders
may be considered vested although subject to divestment upon a condition subsequent. See
id
18. The Maryland Court of Appeals has set forth the following definition of a possibility
of reverter:
A possibility of reverter is any reversionary interest which is subject to a
condition precedent. When the owner of an estate in fee simple absolute transfers
an estate in fee simple determinable, the transferor has a possibility of reverter.
In other words, if one who has an estate in fee simple creates a determinable fee
in another, he has thereafter merely a possibility of reobtaining the land by reason
of the occurrence of the indicated contingency.
Ringgold, 76 A.2d at 332 (citation omitted).
19. Both of these interests are not vested, but are exempt from the Rule more from
historical accident than from their effects on the use of land subject to them. It is said that
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Included, then, within the Rule's ambit are contingent remain-
ders' and executory interests.21  Of these, executory interests
arise most often in the commercial transactions discussed herein.22
Three types of interests traditionally subject to the Rule
Against Perpetuities commonly arise in commercial transactions:
options, preemptive rights and leases to commence in the future.
Both options and preemptive rights can be described as executory
interests, as they act to cut short the estate of the owner of a
present interest prior to the estate's natural termination.23
Options give to their holders the power to force a conveyance of
a parcel of property to them for a specified consideration.
Preemptive rights allow their holder the right of first refusal when
the property they limit is offered for sale by the owner of the
in the "ad hoc" development of the Rule these interests "just didn't get caught in the net."
BERGIN & HASKELL, supra note 8, at 179, 204. See 3 SIMES & SMITH, supra note 11,
§ 1238-39, at 144-48; W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign
of Terror, 65 HARV. L. REV. 721, 739-41 (1952).
Despite being exempt from the Rule, these interests may be subject to other
restrictions. Many jurisdictions limit the duration of possibilities of reverter and rights of
entry. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 6-101(b) (Michie, WESTLAW through 1996
Reg. Sess.) (limiting the life of such interests created on or after July 1, 1969 to thirty years).
Other jurisdictions require under marketable title acts that the interests be rerecorded
periodically to remain valid. See, e.g., UNIF. SIMPLIFICATION OF LAND TRANSFERS Acr
§ 3-409 (amended 1990), 14 U.L.A. 301 (1990). See also MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP.
§ 6-102 (Michie, WESTLAW through 1996 Reg. Sess.) (requiring a "notice to preserve" to
be periodically recorded to avoid extinguishment of interests created before July 1, 1969).
20. See 3 StmEs & SMrrH, supra note 11, § 1237, at 142-44. Maryland defines the
essential characteristics of an executory interest as follows:
First, on the happening of a condition or event, an estate vests in the holder of the
executory interest, and it is not vested until that time. So long as it remains a
future interest it is non-vested. Second, it must vest in some person other than the
creator of the executory interest. Third, with the exception of the executory
interest after the determinable fee and the fee simple conditional, it vests in
derogation of a vested freehold estate and not at the termination of a freehold
estate. Fourth, on the happening of the condition or event, it may become a
present interest automatically; no entry or election being necessary.
Boyd v. Boyd, 332 A.2d 328, 334 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975) (quoting 1 SIMEs & SMrrH,
supra note 11, § 221, at 249).
21. See 3 SIMES & SMrrH, supra note 11, § 1236, at 140.
22. Contingent remainders arise only from devises or conveyances of life estates where
the testator or grantor provides for the transfer of the remainder interest following the life
estate to a person or class of persons whose identity is not certain until the occurrence of
some contingency. See 1 SIMEs & SMrH, supra note 11, § 103, at 81-82. Such conveyances
typically arise from the devise or bequest of property; but they are infrequently, if ever,
encountered in commercial transactions.
23. See 2A POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY I 272[la], at 38 (1995) (defining
executory interests).
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present interest.24 Leases to commence in the future have the
same effect for the purposes of the Rule as do executory inte-
rests.' Under a traditional analysis, all of these interests would
violate the Rule Against Perpetuities if their vesting were to be
temporally unrestricted.
B. Modern Reforms to the Rule Against Perpetuities
In the early twentieth century, the "remorseless" application
of the Rule Against Perpetuities26 began to be criticized by
scholars for results that they deemed absurd.27 Prominent for
such criticism was Professor W. Barton Leach of Harvard Law
School, whose prolific writings' shaped the modem form of the
American Rule Against Perpetuities throughout the middle of this
century. Leach, in a 1952 article, attacked the Rule as too
mechanistic, calling for reform of the Rule's application.29
Reforms to the Rule took place soon after when State legislatures
24. "[A] right of first refusal to purchase property is commonly known as a 'preemptive
right.' It is an interest in property, and not merely a contractual right, whereby the
preemptioner acquires an equitable right in the property, which vests only when the property
owner decides to sell." Ayers v. Townsend, 598 A.2d 470, 474 (Md. 1991).
25. A lease to commence in the future is an interest that is not vested upon its creation
but can only become vested upon the tenant's entry into possession of the leasehold estate.
Gray, in his treatise on the Rule, in explaining which interests are vested upon their creation,
stated "[tlhus:... (2) Rights less than ownership in land of others to begin in futuro are not
vested until they begin." GRAY, supra note 7, § 114, at 107-08. A right to a leasehold
interest that begins in the future is such a right as it purports to give to the grantee only the
future right to a limited estate in land, not a fee simple estate. See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *317 (defining a lease as a conveyance of land "always for a less time than
the lessor hath in the premises").
26. GRAY, supra note 7, § 629, at 599. Gray said that after the instrument creating a
future interest was construed so as to effectuate the intent of the testator, the Rule should
then be applied remorselessly. See id.
27. Familiar to students of the Rule are the classic examples of "the fertile octogenari-
an," "the unborn widow," and "the slothful executor," in which interests are voided because
(respectively) an elderly gentleman is presumed to be fertile, a testator's bequest to another
person's "widow" is held to not necessarily refer to a woman living at the time of the
interest's creation, or an executor's administration of an estate is presumed to take longer
than twenty-one years after the death of all lives in being at the time of the interest's
creation. Representative cases of these examples are: Jee v. Audley, 1 Cox 324, 29 Eng.
Rep. 1186 (Ch. 1787); Perkins v. Igiehart, 39 A.2d 672 (Md. 1944). Professor Leach criticized
these holdings in his article calling for reform of the Rule. See Leach, supra note 19, 731-34
(1952).
28. In addition to the several works of Leach cited supra notes 5, 7, and 19, Leach also
authored W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities: New Absurdity, Judicial and Statutory Correctives,
73 HARV. L. REV. 1318 (1960).
29. See Leach, supra note 19, at 745-49.
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enacted "wait and see" statutes and courts began to use cy pres to
reform interests that on their face violated the Rule.
1. Wait and See.-The "wait and see" method of analyzing
interests subject to the Rule judges interests retrospectively after a
statutorily defined waiting period. 0  Instead of prospectively
examining and voiding the interest from the time of its creation,
wait and see jurisdictions will not void an interest for violating the
Rule unless an actual event or the actual nonoccurrence of an
event prevents an interest from vesting within the statutorily
defined waiting period (usually ninety years).3
In 1947, Pennsylvania became the first jurisdiction to adopt the
wait and see modification to the Rule Against Perpetuities.32 The
statute lists as an exception to the common law Rule that "[u]pon
the expiration of the period allowed by the common law rule
against perpetuities as measured by actual rather than possible
events, any interest not then vested and any interest in members of
a class the membership of which is then subject to increase shall be
void."33 While the official comment to the 1947 statute claims that
this exception was "intended to disturb the common law rule as
little as possible,"' the Pennsylvania statute requires courts to
examine the validity of future interests in a radically different way
than is done under the common law Rule, which traditionally
requires that possibilities be considered prospectively from the time
of the interest's creation without reference to actual occurrences
after the date of creation.35
The Pennsylvania statute typifies the broad wait and see
legislation present in eight states.36 The broad version of the wait
30. See 5A POWELL, supra note 23, 827B[2].
31. This is in contrast to the method of analyzing interests under the traditional common
law Rule Against Perpetuities, which commands that any possibility of an interest vesting too
late be taken into account. See id.
32. See Leach, supra note 7, at 1128.
33. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6104 (West, WESTLAW through 180th Reg. Sess. Act
1996-133 and through 1996 Sp. Sess. No. 2 Act 10) (emphasis added).
34. Commission's Report on Subsection (b), reprinted in 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 6104 (West, WESTLAW through 180th Reg. Sess. Act 1996-133 and through 1996 Sp. Sess.
No. 2 Act 10) (official comment).
35. See BERGIN & HASKELL, supra note 8, at 213-15.
36. The seven other states are: Iowa, Kentucky, Ohio, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia,
and Washington. See id. at 213 n.6. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 558.68 (West, WESTLAW
through 1995 Reg. Sess.); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 381.216 (Baldwin, WESTLAW through
1996 Reg. Sess.); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2131.08(c) (Baldwin, WESTLAW through 1996
[Vol. 101:3
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and see rule mandates that a court wait until the end of the
perpetuities period, if necessary, to determine if the contingency to
the vesting of an interest actually occurs.37 A more limited form
of the wait and see rule, often known as the "Massachusetts-style"
rule,38 "waits" only until the expiration of life estates possessed by
individuals who were lives in being at the time of the transaction
in question.39 This limited form of the wait and see doctrine is
used in two states.4°
2. The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities.-A
variation on the wait-and-see modification is used by those states
that have adopted the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetu-
ities.41 In the Uniform Rule, a flat waiting period of ninety years
is used as an alternative to lives in being plus twenty-one years.42
The ninety year waiting period was intended to reasonably
approximate the average period of time reached when measuring
portion of 121st G.A. File 240); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-11-38 (WESTLAW through 1996 Reg.
Sess.); VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 27, § 501 (WESTLAW through 1995 Reg. Sess.); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 55-13.3 (Michie, WESTLAW through 1996 Reg. Sess.); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 11.98.130,
11.98.900 (West, WESTLAW through 1996 Reg. Sess.).
37. See BERGIN & HASKELL, supra note 8, at 214.
38. See, e.g., 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.11, at 856 (Supp. 1977). The limited
form is referred to as the Massachusetts rule because that state was the first to adopt it.
Massachusetts, however, has since repealed the statute and adopted the Uniform Statutory
Rule Against Perpetuities. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184A, §§ 1-11 (West,
WESTLAW through 1996 2d Annual Sess. ch. 151).
39. See BERGIN & HASKELL, supra note 8, at 214.
40. See id. n.7. The two states with the more limited wait and see rule are Maine and
Maryland. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 33, § 101 (West, WESTLAW through through
1996 2d Sp. Sess.); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRuSTS § 11-103(a) (Michie, WESTLAW
through 1996 Reg. Sess.).
41. The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities has been adopted in twenty-four
states. See UNIF. STATUTORY RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES table of jurisdictions (amended
1990), 8B U.L.A. 41 (Supp. 1996). These states are: Alaska, Arizona, California,
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Massachusettes, Michigan, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, South
Carolina, Tennessee, and West Virginia. See i&
42. The Uniform Rule provides the ninety year waiting period as an alternative to the
traditional Rule. Only if an interest would be void under the tradtional Rule need one wait
to see if it actually vests. The Uniform Rule provides:
(a) A nonvested property interest is invalid unless:
(1) when the interest is created, it is certain to vest or terminate no later than 21
years after the death of an individual then alive; or
(2) the interest either vests or terminates within 90 years after its creation.
Unif. Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities § 1 (amended 1990), 8B U.L.A. 333 (1993). The
Uniform Rule includes similiar provisions for powers of appointment. See id. § l(b),(c), 8B
U.L.A. at 333-34.
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lives are used. 3 Under the Uniform Rule, courts wait until ninety
years after the creation of an interest to see if contingencies to that
interest's vesting occur."
The Uniform Rule was intended to give interests that would
otherwise be void under the traditional Rule a "second chance." 45
The two-step analysis of an interest under the Uniform Rule'
adds to the traditional analysis of interests only to the extent that
they are void under the traditional Rule. Thus, the Uniform Rule
purports to require no modification to the drafting of interests
previously held valid; if an interest was valid under the traditional
Rule, it will still be valid under the Uniform Rule.47
3. Cy Pres.-The other major reform to the Rule Against
Perpetuities is the cy pres doctrine, which allows courts to reform
interests so as to avoid violating the Rule. The broad version of
the cy pres doctrine provides for the equitable reformation of any
transaction that would violate the Rule.48 A more limited form of
the cy pres doctrine addresses only invalid age contingencies,
allowing courts to cut them down to twenty-one years, thus saving
the interests.
49
Certain states combine an unlimited cy pres provision with wait
and see legislation.5" Such a statute is typified by Vermont's
legislation which states:
Any interest in real or personal property which would violate
the rule against perpetuities shall be reformed, within the limits
of that rule, to approximate most closely the intention of the
creator of the interest. In determining whether an interest
43. See UNIF. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUrrIES prefatory note (amended
1990), 8B U.L.A. 322, 327 (1993); Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Uniform Statutory Rule
Against Perpetuities: The Rationale of the 90-Year Waiting Period, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 157,
158 (1988).
44. See Waggoner, supra note 43, at 157; UNIF. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST
PERPETUITIES § 1(a)(2), 8B U.L.A. at 333.
45. UNIF. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES prefatory note, 8B U.L.A. at 323.
46. See id. § 1(a), 8B U.L.A. at 333. One need not wait to see whether an interest vests
only if it would otherwise be void under the traditional Rule. See id. § 1(a)(2).
47. See id. prefatory note, 8B U.L.A. at 329.
48. Such cy pres statutes have been adopted in Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Missouri, Ohio,
Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. See BERGIN & HASKELL, supra note 8, at 218
n.14.
49. Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusettes, and New York employ cy
pres only to reduce excessive age contingencies to twenty-one years. See id. at 219 n.15.




would violate said rule and in reforming an interest the period
of perpetuities shall be measured by actual rather than possible
events.
51
This type of statute has the effect of allowing liberal court
intervention in the construction of a testator's wishes, both
permitting the reformation of the language of the conveyance to
satisfy the Rule and waiting to see whether contingencies are
satisfied.
4. Other Reforms.-In addition to the wait and see and cy
pres reforms to the Rule Against Perpetuities, some states have
chosen to specifically address some of the presumptions made
under the common law rule, specifically the presumption of
fertility.52 New York is such a state. The New York legislature has
adopted rules of construction that specifically rebut the pre-
sumptions upon which the oft-criticized unborn widow,53 slothful
executor, 4 fertile octogenarian55 and precocious toddler 6 cases
are based.57 Under New York law, a living person may introduce
evidence regarding that person's ability to have a child.5"
The Maryland General Assembly has enacted only limited
modifications to the common law Rule Against Perpetuities. Four
types of transactions are exempted from the common law Rule: (1)
trusts providing for the perpetual care of a cemetery lot;59 (2)
transfers from charitable corporations subject to contingencies;'
(3) trusts established by employers for the benefit of employees
51. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 501 (WESTLAW through 1995 Reg. Sess.).
52. See supra note 27.
53. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.3(c) (McKinney, WESTLAW through
L. 1996 ch. 599).
54. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.3(d) (McKinney, WESTLAW through
L. 1996 ch. 599).
55. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.3(e) (McKinney, WESTLAW through
L. 1996 ch. 599).
56. See id. The "precocious toddler" rule, a corolary of the fertile octogenarian rule,
"conclusively presum[es] that a girl can have a child at the age of five." Leach, The Nutshell
Revisted, supra note 5, at 992.
57. For a discussion of these cases, see Leach, supra note 19, at 731-34.
58. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.3(e)(2) (McKinney, WESTLAW
through L. 1996 ch. 599).
59. See MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 11-102(a) (Michie, WESTLAW through 1996
Reg. Sess.).
60. See MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 11-102(b) (Michie, WESTLAW through
1996 Reg. Sess.).
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and beneficiaries of the employees;61 and (4) trusts for charitable
purposes.62 Additionally, Maryland employs both the cy pres and
wait and see doctrines to contingent remainders.' Cy pres may
be used only to reduce the age contingency of a remainder interest
following a life estate.64 Maryland courts have been hesitant to
adopt judicial exceptions to the common law rule absent legislative
approval.65
III. Analysis
Because the Rule Against Perpetuities developed primarily to
combat familial transfers of land that tended to keep property
locked up within one family,' some writers have criticized the
application of the Rule to arm's length commercial transactions.
Such criticism has led to the carving out of exceptions to the Rule
with respect to commercial transactions. Courts use two major
approaches to avoid applying the Rule to commercial transactions
or by which they save interests created by such transactions from
violating the Rule.
61. See MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 11-102(c) (Michie, WESTLAW through 1996
Reg. Sess.).
62. See MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 11-102(d) (Michie, WESTLAW through
1996 Reg. Sess.) (adopting the test for charitable purposes established by the Statute of
Charitable Uses, 43 Eliz. ch. 4 (1601) (Eng.)).
63. See MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 11-103 (Michie, WESTLAW through 1996
Reg. Sess.).
64. See MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 11-103(b) (Michie, WESTLAW through
1996 Reg. Sess.).
65. See Ferrero Constr. Co. v. Dennis Rourke Corp., 536 A.2d 1137, 1144 (Md. 1988).
The court cautioned that "[w]hen the legislature has expressly enumerated certain exceptions
to a principle, courts normally should be reluctant thereafter to create additional exceptions,"
and reversed the lower court's exemption of rights of first refusal from the Rule Against
Perpetuities. Id.
66. See BERGIN & HASKELL, supra note 8, at 178-80 (describing the rule as the primary
means of combating "dead-hand" control of land and its roots in seventeenth-century
England).
For an historical perspective on the social, political and economic forces which gave
rise to rules designed to encourage the free alienability of land, see Charles J. Reid, Jr., The
Seventeenth-Century Revolution in the English Land Law, 43 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 221,261-81
(1995). There, the author asserts that rules encouraging the free alienability of land
developed as "compromises between two competing impulses: The need to maintain a
market in land satisfactory to meet rising levels of demand, on the one hand, and the desire
of the gentry, on the other, to conserve their landholdings and pass them down intact to the
next generation." Id. at 281.
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A. Methods by Which Courts Have Attempted to Exempt
Commercial Transactions from the Rule
To avoid having the Rule Against Perpetuities void commer-
cial transactions, courts have taken various approaches to either
hold the interests in question vested upon creation and thus exempt
from the Rule's application or to imply a reasonable time for the
satisfaction of the contingency to which the interest's vesting is
subject.
Recently courts have merged principles of contract law with
the Rule to create a presumption that, where the parties are
otherwise silent, the satisfaction of a contingency affecting the
vesting of an interest must occur within a reasonable time, which
is held to be necessarily less than twenty-one years.
1. The Implication of a Reasonable Time for the Satisfaction
of Conditions to the Vesting of Interests in Commercial Transac-
tions.-The leading case supporting the implication of a reasonable
time for the vesting of an interest in a commercial transaction is
Wong v. DiGrazia.67 In this case the California Supreme Court
upheld under the Rule a lease to commence upon the completion
of a shopping center.' In Wong, DiGrazia and Wong entered
67. 386 P.2d 817 (Cal. 1963) (en banc).
68. Such "on-completion" leases are commonly executed between shopping center
developers and prospective tenants. They are typically used by developers to secure in
advance tenants for a contemplated shopping center. The term of the lease usually
commences upon the completion of the shopping center's construction. Such leases have
spawned litigation under the Rule. See, e.g., In re Wonderfair Stores, Inc., 511 F.2d 1206 (9th
Cir. 1975) (shopping center lease); Omath Holding Co. v. City of New York, 545 N.Y.S.2d
557 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (lease to commence upon rezoning of property); City of Santa
Cruz. v. MacGregor, 2 Cal. Rptr. 727 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (on completion lease). For
a discussion on such agreements to lease in the future, see generally 3 MILTON R.
FREEDMAN, FRIEDMAN ON LEASES §§ 34.1-.7, at 1571-1612 (3d ed. 1990).
Contracts for leases to commence in the future create what is known, in the traditional
language of future interests, an interesse termini. The Maryland Court of Appeals described
the interesse termini thus:
Under the common law, until the lessee enters, he has no estate [in land],
but only an interesse termini, a right to enter. Interesse termini applies to two
situations, where the term stated in the lease has commenced but the lessee has
not taken possession, and where there is a lease to take effect in the future ....
Thus, one who is a lessee under a validly executed lease to commence in the
future immediately becomes the owner of a future interest, a right of entry, which
will ripen into a possessory estate when the term commences and when the lessee
enters. The lessee acquires no possessory estate until the term commences and
he enters upon the land.
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into an agreement by the terms of which DiGrazia was to erect a
building and lease it to Wong for a term of ten years.69 The
agreement between the parties required DiGrazia, the lessor, to
complete the building within ninety days after a building permit
was issued by San Francisco.' Wong's lease was not to com-
mence until the building was completed.71
In holding that the agreement between the parties required
construction of the building to be completed within a reasonable
time, the California Supreme Court reviewed cases that dealt with
such leases72 in addition to scholarly works on the Rule. The
court concluded that the rigid application of the Rule to such an
on-completion lease was inappropriate:
The rule against perpetuities originated as a rule of
property law during the mercantilistic period of English history.
... The social order of 1682 demanded as to its property
transactions certainty in title and fixation of ownership; the idea
of titles which had not vested or ownership which remained
Arthur Treacher's Fish & Chips, Inc. v. Chillum Terrace Ltd. Partnership, 327 A.2d 282,287
(Md. 1974) (citation omitted). Note, however, that the term interesse termini can have a
different meaning, depending upon whether it is used to refer to a tenant under a present
lease who has not yet entered the land or a grantee of an interest in a lease to commence
in the future who cannot yet enter the land. See 1 TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
§ 86, at 133 (3d ed. 1939 & Supp. 1995).
69. See Wong, 386 P.2d at 819-20.
70. See id. at 820. The pertinent provisions of the agreement between the parties
provided:
"Lessor (defendants) shall forthwith commence the construction of a building
upon the herein demised premises, in accordance with plans and specifications.
... Construction shall commence forthwith upon approval of completed plans and
specifications and shall continue expeditiously until said buildings [sic] is
completed, subject to material and/or labor shortages, strikes, lockouts, govern-
mental actions and all causes beyond control of lessor. Said building shall be
completed within ninety (90) days after a building permit has been secured from
the City and County of San Francisco of said plans and specifications, subject to
the contingencies above mentioned .... Upon completion of said building ...
Lessor shall forthwith cause a Notice of Completion to be recorded, and the term
of this lease shall commence upon the recording of said Notice of Completion."
Id. (quoting paragraph 27 of the parties' agreement).
71. See id.
72. The court cited with approval the results reached in several similar cases but
disagreed with their reasoning. See Isen v. Giant Food, Inc. 295 F.2d 136 (D.C. App. 1961);
City of Santa Cruz v. MacGregor, 2 Cal. Rptr. 727 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1960); Halifax v.
Vaughn Constr. Co., 9 D.L.R.2d 431 (N.S. 1957) (Can.). The court expressly disagreed with
two other cases that voided on-completion leases under the Rule: Southern Airways Co. v.
De Kalb County, 115 S.E.2d 602 (Ga. 1960); Haggerty v. City of Oakland, 326 P.2d 957 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
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inchoate was necessarily anathema. Indeed, the basic purpose
of the rule was to limit family dispositions, and in that context
the period of lives in being plus 21 years served as a proper
measurement. Only later by an overextension of nineteenth
century concepts did the courts apply the rule to commercial
transactions.
... Surely the courts do not seek to invalidate bona fide
transactions by the imported application of esoteric legalisms.
Our task is not to block the business pathway but to clear it,
defining it by guideposts that are reasonably to be expected.
... We therefore do not propose to apply the rule in the rigid
or remorseless manner characterized by some past decisions;
instead we shall seek to interpret it reasonably, in the light of
its objectives and the economic conditions of modem society.
73
The court rejected the idea of construing the lease as creating a
presently vested future interest to escape the Rule's application,74
calling such a method a "contrived technicality.
75
In holding that a reasonable time could be implied for the
satisfaction of the contingencies76 to the commencement of the
lease, the court explicitly rejected the reasoning adopted by an
earlier California court, which had refused to so imply a reasonable
time.77 This opinion was criticized by the Wong court as failing to
recognize that the courts have "evolved exceptions to the rule.
'"78
A corollary to the Wong court's holding was its refusal to base
its analysis of the lease under the Rule on the assumption that one
of the parties would violate an obligation under the agreement
while the other party would leave such a breach unremedied.79
The court hypothesized that under such reasoning even a specific
73. Wong, 386 P.2d at 823 (citations and footnote omitted).
74. Such a means of interpretation has been used by other courts effectively to exempt
commercial transactions from the Rule's application. See, e.g., Isen, 295 F.2d 136; In re
Wonderfair Stores, 511 F.2d 1206. For a discussion of such a method, see infra Part III.A.2.
75. Wong, 386 P.2d at 824.
76. The court found that four contingencies affected the commencement of Wong's
lease: (1) the construction of the building itself; (2) the approval of the plans; (3) the
exceptions contained in the agreement's force majore clause; and (4) the issuance of the
building permit for the construction. See id.
77. See id. at 825 (disapproving the holding of Haggerty v. City of Oakland, 326 P.2d
957 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958)).
78. Id.
79. See id. at 826 (specifically referring to the obligation of DiGrazia to commence
construction expeditiously).
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provision in the lease requiring the commencement date to occur
within twenty-one years could possibly be violated by the parties,
just as their duty to complete construction in a reasonable time
could be violated. ° The court concluded: "we are not willing to
predicate a transgression of the rule [against perpetuities] on the
theory that agreements must be presumed to be broken and parties
unwilling to enforce their rights."
81
The Wong decision has been followed by courts in other
jurisdictions both with respect to leases to commence in the
future' and other interests. Using the theory that a reasonable
time may be implied for the satisfaction of contingencies to the
vesting of an interest, courts have saved from the Rule' preemp-
tive rights,8 options" and contingent sales contracts. 86  Some
courts have extended this line of reasoning from commercial
transactions to purely donative transfers,87 although many of the
80. See Wong, 386 P.2d at 826.
81. IdL
82. See, e.g., Singer Co. v. Makad, Inc., 518 P.2d 493 (Kan. 1974). The Kansas Supreme
Court held it reasonable to assume that in the "hurried, competitive atmosphere of today's
commercial world" sophisticated businessmen "would not contemplate entering into a lease
arrangement contingent on events which might not transpire until twenty-one years had gone
by." Id. at 499.
83. It is important to distinguish between an interest which is held to not violate the
Rule, see cases cited in notes 74-77 infra, and interests that are exempt from the Rule-hence
the use of the phrase "saved from the Rule." While some courts have declared interests
created by commercial transactions exempt from the Rule, their decision to do so is of
doubtful wisdom as is discussed infra Part III.A.2.
84. See Wildenstein & Co. v. Wallis, 595 N.E.2d 828 (N.Y. 1992); Metropolitan Transp.
Auth. v. Bruken Realty Corp., 536 A.2d 814 (N.Y. 1986) (refusing to apply New York's
statutory Rule, N.Y. EsT. POWERS & TRusTs LAW § 9-1.1(b) (McKinney, WESTLAW
through L. 1996 ch. 599), to preemptive rights in "commercial and governmental
transaction[s]" where giving effect to the rights would serve the public interest).
85. Courts have saved from violation of the Rule both options appurtenant to a transfer
of land, see, e.g., Peterson v. Tremain, 621 N.E.2d 385 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993); Yentile v.
Howland, 525 N.E.2d 689 (Mass. App. Ct. 1988); Ryland Group, Inc. v. Wills, 331 S.E.2d 399
(Va. 1985), and options in gross. See Pathmark Stores, Inc. v. 3821 Assocs., Inc., 663 A.2d
1189 (Del. Ch. 1995). But see Symphony Space Inc. v. Pergola Properties, Inc., 669 N.E.2d
799, 804-05 (N.Y. 1996) (refusing to exempt options created in commercial transactions from
the Rule absent legislative amendment of New York's stautory rule against perpetuities).
Courts have also implied a reasonable time with respect to options appurtenant to gas and
oil leases. See El Paso Prod. Co. v. P.W.G. Partnership, 566 P.2d 311 (N.M. 1993) (saving
the option by both implying a reasonable time and using the "wait and see" approach
mandated under New Mexico and Texas law).
86. See Read v. G.H.D.C., Inc., 334 S.E.2d 165 (Ga. 1985).
87. See, e.g., Young v. Cass, 340 S.E.2d 185 (Ga. 1986).
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policy reasons for saving transactions from the Rule disappear
outside the commercial context.
Courts that refuse to read a reasonable time into commercial
transactions creating a future interest generally rely upon the
policies of the Rule itself as outweighing the benefits of the
commercial transactions lauded by the jurisdictions that exempt
them from being voided under the Rule. Often the determination
of the benefits of the transaction is dependent upon the nature of
the interest in question. For instance, in Pace v. Culpepper,' a
Mississippi court struck down as void under the Rule an option to
purchase land created appurtenant to a commercial conveyance of
land." The court reasoned that option contracts that have the
potential of vesting too late should not be upheld because
such [options] take property out of commerce and prevent land
from answering to the needs of growing communities. No
improvements can be made on land so encumbered because the
land always remains subject to being taken under the option.
It is not a matter which affects the rights of individuals only,
but the welfare of the public is at stake.'
Other courts, however, merely apply the common law Rule without
regard to competing policies to declare interests void.91
2. Jurisdictions that exempt from the Rule's application
interests created in commercial transactions by holding that such
interests are vested upon their creation.-Another way in which
jurisdictions uphold commercial transactions that would violate the
common law Rule Against Perpetuities is to hold that the interest
in question is vested upon creation and, therefore, exempt from the
Rule's application. Such a method is a less desirable alternative to
the implication of a reasonable time because it is done without
regard to the competing policies of the Rule and the commercial
transactions that are upheld. Absent such an analysis of competing
interests, nothing in the opinions of those courts limits the
application of the holding to just commercial transactions. Thus,
courts that hold interests as vested upon creation to exempt a
commercial transaction may be creating precedent that may be
88. 347 So. 2d 1313 (Miss. 1977).
89. See i& at 1318.
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., Southern Airways Co. v. De Kalb County, 115 S.E.2d 207 (Ga. 1960).
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used to exempt interests created by the very donative transfers
against which the Rule was designed to guard.
The ninth circuit held in part that a shopping center lease, the
term of which was to commence upon completion of a shopping
center, conveyed a present interest to the lessee in the land
underlying the shopping center to be built.92 The court construed
the present tense language of the agreement between the parties,
the right of entry prior to completion given to the prospective
tenant, and the inclusion of covenants running with the land as
indicating the intent of the parties to transfer some present interest
to the lessee, not merely an interest to commence in the future. 93
This method of treating commercial transactions under the
Rule is of questionable merit. By misreading years of common law
precedent, courts hold interests to be vested upon creation for the
purpose of exempting a commercial transaction from the Rule.
However, when the policy reasons for so exempting a transaction
do not exist, as in the case of a donative, familial conveyance or
demise, jurisdictions are left with precedent that cannot be
distinguished, yet can serve to defeat the very purposes of the Rule.
B. Maryland's Hybrid Approach to the Implication of a Reason-
able Time in Commercial Transactions
Maryland courts, in a recent line of cases,94 have seemingly
joined other jurisdictions following Wong by implying a reasonable
time for the satisfaction of conditions precedent to the vesting of
an interest, but with the distinction that such an implication is made
only when the condition is controlled by a party to the instrument
creating the interest. 95
In Dorado Limited Partnership v. Broadneck Development
Corp. ,96 the Maryland Court of Appeals iterated what has become
Maryland's test for whether a reasonable time, less than the
perpetuities period, will be implied for the fulfillment of a condition
92. See In re Wonderfair Stores, Inc., 511 F.2d 1206 (9th Cir. 1975).
93. See id. at 1211 (distinguishing the case of Target Stores, Inc. v. Twin Plaza Co., 153
N.W.2d 832 (Minn. 1967), as basing its holding on contract language more strongly suggesting
the parties' intent that no lease or rights would exist until the completion of the shopping
center).
94. See Dorado Ltd. Partnership v. Broadneck Dev. Corp., 562 A.2d 757 (Md. 1989);
Stewart v. Tuli, 573 A.2d 109 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990); Hays v. Coe, 595 A.2d 484 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1990), vacated on other grounds, 614 A.2d 576 (Md. 1992).
95. See Wong v. DiGrazia, 386 P.2d 817 (Cal. 1963) (en banc).
96. 562 A.2d 757 (Md. 1989).
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precedent to save an interest from violating the Rule Against
Perpetuities. Dorado limits such an implication to conditions
precedent controlled by a party to the instrument creating the
interest.' Where third parties control the fulfillment of the
condition, a reasonable time will not be implied and an interest that
may possibly vest later than the perpetuities period will still violate
the Rule.98
In Dorado, on June 23, 1981, Dorado Limited Partnership and
Broadneck Development Corporation entered into a real estate
sales contract.9 In addition to agreeing to sell a certain number
of lots to Dorado, Broadneck also granted to Dorado an option to
purchase additional lots.1" After the settlement of certain lots,
the contract of sale was amended 1 and the amendment, which
was the subject of the Court of Appeal's decision, provided as
follows:
1. Buyer agrees to purchase and settle on all remaining lots
covered by the Contract of Sale by payment of the purchase
price in cash not later than ninety (90) days after the Seller has
delivered to Buyer evidence of sewer allocations of such lots.
Time is of the essence of all the provisions of the Contract of
Sale. c2
Under the terms of the agreement between Dorado and
Broadneck, the actual purchase of the lots could not occur until
after Broadneck obtained a sewer allocation for the lots covered by
the option. During the period of the transaction, Anne Arundel
County was experiencing a moratorium on sewer allocations, so it
was impossible for Broadneck to procure the necessary sewer
allocations to proceed with sale. 3
In concluding that the Option Agreement violated the Rule
Against Perpetuities, the Dorado court reasoned:
We agree with the Supreme Court of Virginia that where the
occurrence of the condition precedent to a conveyance is
beyond the control of the parties, a reasonable time for perfor-
97. See id. at 762.
98. See id.; Stewart v. Tuli, 573 A.2d 109 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990); Hays v. Coe, 595
A.2d 484 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991), vacated on other grounds, 614 A.2d 576 (Md. 1992).







mance, less than the perpetuities period, cannot be implied.
This position is in accord with our decision in Commonwealth
v. Bowers ....
In this case, Broadneck has fulfilled its obligation under
the contract. It has applied for a sewer allocation. Settlement
is dependent, not on performance by Broadneck, but on the
action of a third party, Anne Arundel County. Whether Anne
Arundel County might grant a sewer allocation is unknown.
We conclude, therefore, that the contract for the sale of
the remaining lots is unenforceable because it violates the Rule
Against Perpetuities. 4
One subsequent decision by the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals, Maryland's intermediate appellate court, applied the
Dorado rule. In Stewart v. Tuli, °5 Stewart entered into a contract
for the purchase of land owned by Novak. The same land had
been the subject of a previous sales agreement to Tuli, which was
allegedly declared void by Novak and Tli.1c" Because the
Stewart contract called for Novak to deliver clear title to the land,
the question of applicability of the Rule Against Perpetuities arose
respecting whether Tali's continued claim to the land was a
contingency to the transfer of the land to Stewart that might cause
Stewart's interest in the land to vest too remotely. By holding that
the contract required Novak to transfer clear title to Stewart within
a reasonable time and thus satisfied the Rule Against Perpetu-
ities,1° the Court of Special Appeals fleshed out the corollary to
the Dorado court's refusal to so imply a reasonable time when
neither party controlled the contingency.'~ Although the con-
tract provided that Novak's action to clear title "must be taken
promptly,"'" the Court of Special Appeals explained in a later
case that such language was not essential to its holding and
104. Dorado, 562 A.2d at 762 (referring to the Virginia case of Ryland Group, Inc. v.
Wills, 331 S.E.2d 399, 403 (Va. 1985)).
105. 573 A.2d 109 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990).
106. See id. at 110.
107. See id at 114.
108. Although the court stated that "the condition precedent to conveyance is judicial
determination of the validity of the Tuli contract," id. at 112 (emphasis added), it appears
that the court, in distinguishing this case from the holding of Dorado, treated the condition
as controlled by Novak and thus subject to the implication of a reasonable time for
satisfaction.
109. Id. at 113.
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suggested that it would have held similarly absent such lan-
guage.
110
Read together, Maryland's Dorado and Tuli decisions
demonstrate the fine line that is drawn between cases in which a
reasonable time will be implied and those in which it will not. In
Dorado, the sales transaction was voided because the contingency
affecting the conveyance was controlled by a municipal board; in
Tuli a transaction was upheld even though the contingency
affecting its conveyance was to be determined by the judiciary.
With such a gray line between two opposite results, it would appear
to be left up to the skill of advocates in litigation to characterize
the party who controls the contingency. Consider, for example, a
land sales contract settlement which is contingent upon the securing
of rezoning for the property to be sold. Such a contract could be
interpreted as either imposing upon the seller the duty to secure
rezoning of the property or as leaving the matter up to the decision
of the local zoning board. However, this variation in interpretation
would determine whether the contract violated the Rule Against
Perpetuities under the Dorado rule.'
The Dorado court predicated much of its reasoning on the case
of United Virginia Bank v. Union Oil Co.,"2 in which the Virginia
Supreme Court originally stated a test similar to that adopted in
Dorado. There the court held that an option that became effective
upon the completion of a proposed highway could not be saved by
the implication of a reasonable time for the commencement of the
option period. 3 Citing factual distinctions between Union Oil
and an earlier federal case, the court refused to extend the
reasoning of Isen v. Giant Food,"4 a case applying Virginia law
that did imply a reasonable time to the facts before it."5 The
Virginia court held that the intent of the parties to the option
agreement was irrelevant, because neither party could "bring about
110. See Hays v. Coe, 595 A.2d 484 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991), vacated on other grounds,
614 A.2d 576 (Md. 1992).
111. An option contingent upon such an arrangement was held to violate the Rule
Against Perpetuities in Commonwealth Realty v. Bowers, 274 A.2d 353 (Md. 1971).
112. 197 S.E.2d 174 (Va. 1973).
113. See id.
114. 295 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
115. See United Va. Bank, 197 S.E.2d at 177. Presumably the factual distinction between
the cases centered on whether the party in control of the contingency was a party to the
contract creating the interest in question. See id.
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occurrence of the agreed contingency, 11 6 namely, the construc-
tion of the proposed highway.
The concern implied by the Dorado court that contingencies
controlled by entities not party to the transaction creating the
interest could cause the interest to vest too late would be adequate-
ly addressed by adoption of the Wong rule. Under the Wong
analysis, the failure of a third party to satisfy such a contingency
would amount to frustration of contract, which would allow a party
to the transaction creating the interest to seek rescission of the
contract."7 While it is conceivable that a party to the transaction
might possibly take longer than twenty-one years to enforce its
rights under the contract creating the interest, to so predicate a
violation of the Rule Against Perpetuities is disfavored, both in
Maryland, and in other jurisdictions."'
Finally, the transactions that Maryland purports to exempt
from the rule in Dorado serve socially useful functions. Com-
mercial transactions involving future interests in land encourage the
development of property and, because of the fast-paced nature of
the commercial world, are not likely to tie up land for long periods
of time, the problem that the Rule was designed to prevent. There
is nothing inherent in the control of a contingency by parties to the
contract creating a future interest that so distinguishes commercial
transactions in a way that would exempt socially useful commercial
transactions, while leaving others subject to the Rule. Rather,
Maryland's hybrid approach cuts a wide swath across both socially
useful commercial transactions and those likely to result in interests
that vest too late.
Although the exceptions created by various courts to save
interests that would otherwise violate the Rule Against Perpetuities
would be unnecessary had the drafters of the interests in question
contemplated the Rule's applicability and inserted a savings clause
to avoid the Rule,'19 the fact that exceptions have been crafted to
the Rule, both judicially and by statute, evidences the intent of
both the courts and legislatures to forgive violations of the Rule so
116. Id.
117. See Wong, 386 P.2d at 827-28 (citing the doctrine of commercial frustration as
explained in Lloyd v. Murphy, 153 P.2d 47, 53 (Cal. 1944)).
118. See, e.g., id. at 826 (refusing to predicate a violation of the Rule on the assumption
that parties will break their promises and leave their rights unenforced).
119. Leach noted that he had not encountered any case in which an interest could not
have been saved from the Rule by careful drafting. See Leach, supra note 19, at 723.
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as to effectuate the intent of the parties to the instruments creating
future interests. While parties can certainly have no expectation
that courts will look leniently on poorly written transactions, and
can thus not expect that interests created without contemplation of
the Rule will necessarily be saved by an indulgent court, society
values commercial transactions and places on them a certain degree
of reliance. It is this expectancy that is sacrificed under Maryland's
arbitrary distinction between interests it chooses to save under the
Dorado rule and those it does not.
IV. Conclusion
Various approaches exist by which courts in other jurisdictions
address the problem of commercial transactions under the Rule
Against Perpetuities. Jurisdictions such as California, and those
states which have followed the Wong decision, have made the
choice to value the commercial transactions saved by the implica-
tion of a reasonable time over the technicalities of the Rule
Against Perpetuities. Maryland's exception serves only to intro-
duce yet another technicality into an already complicated area of
the law. The Wong approach to commercial transactions under the
Rule is clearly preferable to Maryland's. It adequately addresses
the concerns ostensibly voiced by the Maryland Court of Appeals
in Dorado and would allow commercial transactions to take place
unfettered by the Rule. By adopting the Wong reasoning,
Maryland would join a majority of other jurisdictions that have
removed from at least one area of realty transactions the hyper-
techhnicalities of a Rule ill-suited to the modern commercial world.
John K. Phoebus
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